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HOFSTRA JAW REVIEW
Volume 25 Summer 1997
THE CLIENT FRAUD PROBLEM AS A JUSTINIAN
QUARTET: AN EXTENDED ANALYSIS
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lawrence Durrell's Alexandria Quartet,' the author presents four
narratives of a series of events about residents of Alexandria. The reader
becomes aware, quickly or slowly, that the narratives address the same
events. Yet Durrell never provides us with an external or objective
viewpoint of these events. Hence, we can only surmise what "really"
happened to the protagonists.
Essentially, the same epistemological point is made in a Pirandello
play.2 This term originally referred to the eponymous author of a specific
work of theatre art. It now generically refers to the fact that various
participants in a transaction view the events differently, interpret the
events differently as they occur, remember them differently, and place
different weights on the subsidiary incidents of the transaction. They also
integrate the remembrance differently into their self-conception or
"identity." The same point is made in Rashomon,3 the Japanese play in
* Director, American Law Institute; Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
Law School; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1953; LL.B., Columbia Law School, 1954.
I. A group of four novels written and meant to be judged as one work. See LAWRENCE
DURRELL, BALTHAZAR (1958); LAWRENCE DURRELL, CLEA (1960); LAWRENCE DURRELL, JUSTINE
(1957); LAWRENCE DURRELL, MO.JNTOLIVE (1958).
2. See LUIGI PIRANDELLO, RIGHT You ARE (Eric Bentley ed., 1954).
3. See RYUNOSUKE AKUTAGAWA, RASHOMON AND OTHER STORIES (Takashi Kojima trans.,
1952).
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which the same transaction is enacted serially from the respective
viewpoints of the participants. One could say that Picasso makes the
same point in his post-blue period "abstract" paintings.
If art can instruct us, we, the critics and caretakers of the law, can
learn from these performances. I will take as my point of departure that
Durrell, Pirandello, Akutagawa, and Picasso are correct. That is, what a
person sees and understands is dependent upon the viewpoint established
through his or her past experience and present position. Indeed, it would
be a foolhardy lawyer who supposes otherwise. A lawyer's professional
work is constantly and unavoidably concerned with problems resulting
from the fact that participants in transactions understand transactions
differently, often very differently, My inquiry concerns the application
of this insight to the work of lawyers themselves.
I also bring to mind that the Emperor Justin is the classic patron of
the legal art. The Justinian Code, promulgated in the sixth century A.D.
under the Emperor's authority, is the model of all law giving. The eternal
hope of law reformers, at least in the Western tradition, is to replicate the
presumed virtues of the Justinian Code-a comprehensive, internally
consistent statement of legal rules having universal application, cast in
language comprehensible to the average citizen, and impervious to the
corrupting power of professional lawyers and judges.
My undertaking will address the rules governing the practice of law
in the technique of the Alexandria Quartet. The basic point is that the
rules governing the practice of law have a different appearance according
to various professional viewpoints.' I will consider four such viewpoints:
the advocate, the judge, the legal counselor, and the legislator. In
imitation of Durrell, I will suggest that these rules constitute not a single
legal text, but a Justinian quartet, hence the title of the Article.
II. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The specific legal problem is whether and under what circumstances
a lawyer may or must take action to interdict or remedy client fraud. In
4. See generally WILHELM BOECK & JAIME SABARTtS, PICAsSO (Milton S. Fox ed., 1955);
THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, PABLO PICASSO: A RETROSPECTIVE (William Rubin ed., 1980).
5. The theme can be considered an extension of articles written by my colleague, Professor
Koniak. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389
(1992). The idea that social phenomena appear different to persons differently situated is, of course,
a very old one. I am informed that Chinese philosophy regards any other view-that is, that social
phenomena could have a single aspect-as a patent absurdity.
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the common parlance of the legal profession, this is the problem of
"whistle-blowing."6
The problem of fraud arises in endless variations including
misrepresentations before a court;7 misrepresentations in transactions
concerning real or personal property-whether selling the property or
effecting a mortgage or marketing an issue of stock or other security;8
misrepresentations in inducing people to put their savings in an unsound
depository institution or to become shareholders in an unsound compa-
ny;9 and misrepresentations to colleagues or superiors by a corporate
official."0
Misrepresentation in violation of the law can run from bare-faced,
full-fledged lies to failure to make disclosure of material facts or
providing less than all the facts in a misleading way. What constitutes
misrepresentation in any given situation depends in part on the governing
law. For example, the rules of disclosure in securities markets are more
exacting than those in a public auction of used automobiles. Thus, laws
external to the rules of professional conduct usually provide the definitive
standard for a specific transaction. Only New Jersey's Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct impose on lawyers an affirmative duty to disclose fraud
6. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 294-323,
776-96 (2d ed. 1994), and the sources cited therein for an extensive list of literature on this subject.
The judicial decisions have been relatively few. See, eg., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974); In re American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz.
1992). A recent endeavor to deal with the subject, only partially successful in my view, is the ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). See Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701 (1993).
7. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174-75 (1986) (holding that an attorney acted
properly by threatening a client with withdrawal if the client presented perjured testimony).
8. See, e.g., Greyeas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1562, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the attorney falsely represented that he had conducted a search revealing the absence of liens on
property, breached his duty of care, and was liable for negligent misrepresentation where the lender
detrimentally relied on that misinformation); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir.
1964) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the auditor who prepared "pro
forma" statements had actual knowledge of the falsity of such reports and deliberately conspired to
defraud investors).
9. See, e.g., American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. at 1442 (holding that an "independent
public accountant who knows of or recklessly disregards a client's fraud may be held liable for
aiding and abetting that fraud where the auditor provides services which constitute substantial
assistance").
10. Cf O'Melveny &Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79,83 (1994) (stating that
state law governs the imputation of corporate officers' knowledge to a corporation that is asserting
claims created by state law).
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going beyond that which ordinarily arises from participation in a
transaction."
It is a sad but not a novel fact that in financial transactions some
clients are inclined to create unsubstantiated expectations in transactions
involving money. The reason, of course, is that there is money to be
made by doing so. When the unsubstantiated expectation is material and
reliance by the victim is not unreasonable in the circumstances, making
money this way is always tortious. These days, given the broad
definitions of mail fraud, 2 securities fraud, 3 and the RICO statute, the
conduct is usually also criminal. 4 By definition, there is always an
innocent victim, or a relatively innocent victim. The victim, if and when
he discovers that he has been taken, usually will want the law to do
something about the matter.
Fraud or alleged fraud poses a variety of legal issues. One such
issue is whether the victim's disappointed expectations are indeed the
product of fraud or merely the result of market perturbations. Another
issue is whether the immediate actor has the requisite intent. Yet another
issue is whether other people might be found to have been complicit in
the transaction in one way or another.
The issue of third party complicity attracts attention on legal and
moral grounds. A principle of equality holds that all members of a gang
of thieves should be brought to book. More than this, however, the issue
attracts attention because of the inherent need to effect redress, that is,
making the victims whole or at least reducing their losses.
Part of the ill-gotten gains of a financial fraud usually will have
been spent long before the fraud is discovered. If the transaction is drawn
into legal question, resolving the legal issues will usually be very
expensive. Since even those who commit fraud have an aversion to
11. See NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1984).
12. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Maybe it Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing
Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REv. 435, 438 (1995) ("The broad reach of the mail
fraud statute.. . has been attributed to the willingness of courts to impose few restrictions on the
application of the 'scheme and artifice to defraud' element of the crime.").
13. See, e.g., William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason, 60
S. CAL. L. REv. 959, 980 (1987) ("Congress and the courts ... [are] adhering to a liberal and
flexible construction of the federal securities laws .... As the definition of securities fraud expands
to include new claims based upon regulatory legislation, the moral taint associated with its assertion
attenuates.").
14. See James E. Spiotto & James M. Breen, RICO: The Potential Applicability of RICO to
Public Debt Litigation, in THE PROBLEMS OF INDENTURE TRUSTEES AND BONDHOLDERS 1991:
DEFAULTED BONDS AND BANKRUPTCY 569, 584 (PLI Real Estate Law Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 366, 1991).
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prison, they are willing to spend their last penny-which originally may
have been a victim's penny-in trying to stay out of jail. Sometimes, as
in the case of the recent debacle in the New Era Philanthropy case,"3 the
bankruptcy will divide the diminished fund among the victims, a
procedure that itself will further diminish the fund. For these and other
reasons, the immediate fraud-doers usually have insufficient assets to
cover the victim's losses.
This practical consideration makes more insistent the inquiry
whether there was complicity on the part of others in the underlying
transaction. Transactions of greater than ordinary complexity will
necessarily involve other players, such as accountants, underwriters, other
financial advisers, and perhaps, a title insurance company.16 Their
participation is necessary on technical grounds. For example, only a
technical specialist, such as an accountant, can competently assess the
details of an entity's financial condition; only an underwriter can
adequately assess the element of rational risk in a venture. These third
parties also lend credibility to a venture that the investors are ordinarily
less familiar with than the entrepreneur and the lawyer. As Judge Henry
Friendly remarked in a leading case dealing with complicity of profes-
sionals in a securities fraud, "[imn our complex society the accountant's
certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting
pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar."' 7
In the now current phrase, the third party professionals are
"gatekeepers."' 8 In other words, reputable professionals will not lend
their assistance to, and thereby enhance the credibility of, legally
improper enterprises." Without third party professional assistance, the
entrepreneur cannot come through the gates of the city into the market-
place.
The third parties are not professional police. To the contrary, their
vocation is to assist transactions, not to obstruct them. Nevertheless,
various considerations induce these professionals to serve in effect as
15. See Joseph A. Slobodzian, It's a New Era for the Fund's Fallen Chief, NAT'L L.J., July
3, 1995, at A12.
16. See Timothy M. Metzger, Comment, Abandoning Accountants' Liability for Aiding and
Abetting Job-5 Securities Fraud, 87 NWV. U. L. REV. 1374, 1395 (1993) ("[Mlost securities
transactions require the assistance of many collateral participants, such as accountants, brokers, and
underwriters.").
17. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).
18. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857, 890 (1984).
19. See id. at 891.
19971
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
market police: moral revulsion at being involved in a legally tainted
transaction; personal embarrassment upon having failed to detect the
character of such a transaction; concern for business or professional
reputation; economically rational recognition that even a large fee is not
worth the eventual cost of being implicated in a tainted transaction; dread
at criminal liability and fear of civil liability; and high anxiety at even
the prospect of becoming legally involved."0 As has often been ob-
served, contemporary American legal process is itself viewed as a
punishment."
The legal problem in these circumstances is to differentiate between
assistance by the professionals that is legitimate and assistance that is
not. The legal problem arising with lawyers and clients is simply a
special case of this more general problem. Some lawyers, anxious about
being held accountable under the law, appear unwilling to appreciate that
the problem concerns other types of gatekeepers as well. They imagine
that they alone are being put to the task of ascertaining whether a client
is engaged in optimistic entrepreneurship or bent on fraud. Lawyers who
hold that supposition might confer with their colleagues in the accounting
profession.
It is commonly understood that even one who commits fraud is
entitled to legal assistance in defending and even defeating a criminal
prosecution. For similar, although less compelling reasons, a defrauder
is also entitled to resist efforts by victims to obtain civil redress. For
even less compelling reasons, it is generally agreed that a client who
wishes to pursue a transaction to the limits of the law may engage legal
assistance in the undertaking. However, it is also commonly understood
that not even a lawyer may knowingly assist a defrauder in carrying out
a fraudulent scheme.
The basic legal problem is to differentiate between innocence and
complicity in terms of substantive legal criteria that do not, through
overbreadth, threaten legitimate lawyer assistance in risky transactions.
A related legal problem is to define exceptions to the rules of attorney-
client confidentiality that will correspond to this substantive distinction.
20. See 1d.
21. See Laura Kalman, BleakHouse, 84 GEo. LJ. 2245,2252 (1996) (reviewing JoHN HENRY
SCHLEGEL, AMEICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995)).
(Vol. 25:1041
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Ill. RETURNING TO ALEXANDRIA
Even the statement of this legal problem has enmeshed us in the
problem of multiple viewpoints. At minimum, the client has a viewpoint
of the transaction that is different from that of the lawyer. When the
client is a corporate entity, there are other participants as well-corporate
officers and directors who speak on behalf of the client but are not,
strictly speaking, clients.' These people all have their own viewpoints,
including fear of being personally charged with complicity if the
transaction is later questioned at law. The other relevant profession-
als-accountants, financial advisers, etc.-have different viewpoints as
well.
At this stage it is useful to step back and make a more general
point. This has to do with a standard method of legal analysis, the
hypothetical case. Every lawyer has been taught through this method,
whether the hypothetical is in the form of appellate cases (as in the
traditional casebook) or a "problem" (as is now in vogue). Every legal
argument is predicated on an assumed state of facts. Every legal opinion
is similarly predicated. Every judicial decision--trial or appel-
late-proceeds on the same basis. Indeed, given the nature of legal
reasoning, it could not be otherwise. Legal reasoning mediates between
general categories and specific instances and addresses the question
whether a given instance does or does not properly come within the
terms of a general category. Without specification of an instance, a legal
issue cannot be stated, let alone resolved.
Durrell would remind us what practicing lawyers know; that is, that
specified facts do not exist in real life. The hypotheticals that were the
means of our professional indoctrination and essential in legal technique
are incomplete portrayals of reality. Rather, the players in the games of
real life all have different understandings of what is happening in a
transaction, different subsequent retrospections of what happened, and
different interpretations of the significance of the event for their
continuing lives. The law's hypotheticals are profoundly misleading if
mistaken for reality.
In human terms (and law is, above all, concerned with human terms)
there are as many significant realities as there are significant players. My
theme will be to develop this proposition by considering the problem of
22. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis,
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 15, 16 (1987).
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client fraud from the four legal viewpoints that have been identified.
IV. THE ADVOCATE
An advocate is never retained by a defrauder; he is retained only by
alleged defrauders. The client represented by an advocate is legally guilty
of criminal fraud only if found to be so through the process of criminal
justice, and is liable for civil fraud only through the counterpart process
of civil justice. Until that point, the client is legally innocent. For the
advocate, the client's state of legal innocence is the equivalent of true
innocence. By "true innocence" I mean the discerning judgment of an
Omniscient Intelligence. That Intelligence exists for those of us who
believe in God, but otherwise exists only in legal hypotheticals and the
mind of the general public.'
There are constraints on what an advocate may do for a legally
innocent client who is accused of fraud. The advocate may not make
misrepresentations to the court concerning either the merits or procedural
matters; nor unjustifiably stall a proceeding or lie to opposing counsel;
nor present evidence, whether testimony or documentary, that he knows
is perjured; nor fail when necessary to counsel the client and other
witnesses not to lie.24 An advocate has a right to refuse to present
evidence that he reasonably believes is false.' When an advocate
discovers that he has presented evidence that he knows is false, he is
required in most jurisdictions to take appropriate remedial measures.26
The matter of remedial measures is, of course, the point of tension
in the advocate's conflicting duties: those owed to the client and those
owed to the court. The advocate's duty to the client is that of loyalty,
often referred to as "complete loyalty."27 The corollary duty to the client
is to maintain the client's confidences, often referred to as a duty to
maintain the confidences inviolate.28 The advocate's duty to the court
is that of candor, often referred to as one of "complete candor."29
23. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 27-28 (1980).
24. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1-.4 (1992).
25. See id. Rule 3.3(c).
26. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(4).
27. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987) ("[W]e generally presume that the lawyer
is fully conscious of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client.").
28. See, e.g., CAL.. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1990) ("It is the duty of an attorney
... [t]o maintain inviolate the confidence.. . of his or her client.").
29. See Christopher E. Dominguez, Note, Congressional Response to Hubbard v. United States:
Restoring the Scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and Codifying the "Judicial Function" Exception, 46
CATH. U. L. REv. 523, 553 n.206 (1997) ("Rule 3.3 requires complete candor from the attorney to
[V/ol. 25:1041
CLIENT FRAUD PROBLEM
Stated as a general principle, these duties are inherently incompati-
ble. It is impossible for an advocate to be completely loyal to a client
and entirely candid with the court. The advocate's very function is that
of go-between from the client to the court, carefully controlling what the
court will learn about what the client knows. Statements cast in terms of
"complete loyalty" and "complete candor" must be regarded as hortatory,
hypocrisy, or simply nonsense.
The crucial issue for the advocate, therefore, is the proper course of
action upon discovering that evidence he has presented consists of
perjury or fabricated documents. This question cannot be resolved as a
matter of principle. As a matter of principle, it is agreed that an advocate
must be both loyal to the client and candid with the court. Since these
governing principles are incompatible, the crucial question-what the
advocate must do--must be resolved by positive law, that is, the rules
specifying the advocate's protocol under such circumstances. The rule
must necessarily compromise one principle or the other.
The appropriate terms for the advocate's protocol remain a matter
of dispute and ambiguity in various circles in the bench and bar. Many
judges hold that the lawyer must disclose the perjury or fabrication to the
court.3" Many academicians and some lawyers agree with that position.
Some academicians and lawyers take the view that the duty to the client
should prevail, so that the advocate's duty to the court is fulfilled when
the client has been told to tell the truth.3
For most practicing advocates, however, the matter is moot because,
as they report, they have never encountered such a situation. In the
experience of these advocates, there are only two real life eventualities:
either the client does not take the stand, or the client, upon taking the
stand, gives testimony that the lawyer did not know was false. 2 In
criminal cases, the client can avoid the stand under the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. In civil cases, the client can avoid the stand by
settling the case. In either event, the reason the client does not take the
stand is ordinarily that counsel considered that the client's testimony
the court.").
30. See, e.g., Florida Bar re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 557 So. 2d
1368, 1370 (Fla. 1990) ("Upon ascertaining that material evidence is false... if it has been offered
... its false character should immediately be disclosed.").
31. Compare Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), with Monroe H. Freedman, Client
Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939 (1988).
32. For a general discussion of information control and professional control and ethics, see
KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 240-50
(1985).
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could be fatally damaging.
Decisions as to whether or not a client will testify are reached by
the attorney undertaking a transposition of viewpoint. The lawyer
temporarily changes his or her approach to the testimony from that of the
client's partisan advocate into that of the trier of fact in order to assess
whether the client's testimony will be believable. Advocates know that
triers of fact are notoriously unsympathetic to witnesses who lie on the
stand. They also know that such lack of sympathy readily translates into
a harsh verdict. Thus, acting as the client's loyal adviser, the advocate
seeks to spare the client such an outcome.
From the viewpoint of a practicing advocate, ethical obligations and
prudential considerations tend to merge. If the client's testimony will be
regarded by the trier of fact as evidently false, that is a good prudential
reason not to present the testimony. If the client's testimony has a
reasonable chance of being believed, then why should the advocate have
to say whether he himself believes the testimony? The advocate thus
finds moral direction in the wisdom of the Alexandria Quartet.3 The
difficult practical problem for an advocate is how to persuade a client
that his testimony is unbelievable, and that accordingly, it would be
imprudent for the client to give the testimony. This is a problem that
goes beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Whether the law should try
to demand more of an advocate poses a legislative question to which we
will come presently.
V. THE JUDGE
The most penetrating expositions of the judge's viewpoint of legal
process is Marvin Frankel's Partisan Justice4 and his predecessor
paper, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal New.'
Analysis begins with recognition of the responsibility of a judge and
of the jury in a jury-tried case. That responsibility is to impose a just
result on parties whose capacity to understand justice has been severely
impaired by their partisan interest in the immediate controversy. To this
end, the judge wants to find out what really happened in the transaction
because assessment of right and wrong requires a fact predicate on which
to proceed. However, as Judge Frankel explains (with most trial judges
33. See discussion supra Parts I, III.
34. FRANKEL, supra note 23.
35. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. RV. 1031
(1975).
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nodding in agreement), the presentations at trial are at best approxima-
tions of truth from which the tribunal must extrapolate a factual
predicate.
The problem of client fraud in the trial setting is simply a special
case of the general problem of fraud with which judges and juries must
deal. However, alleged fraud can also arise in the course of an adjudica-
tion through the presentation of forged documents, the subornation of
witness perjury, or the presentation of perjury by a party. These aspects
are often interrelated because the trial of a case of alleged substantive
fraud often proceeds with false testimony, forged documents, or
fabricated real evidence other than documents.
Naturally, presentation of deliberately falsified evidence is of special
concern to judges. Presentation of such evidence is an attempt to subvert
the process for which judges have special responsibility. Many judges
hold that under all circumstances advocates must perform the role of
gatekeeper. 6 Accordingly, they prohibit the advocate from offering
testimony or other proof that counsel knows to be false, even the client's
testimony which the client insists on presenting. 7 Further, these judges
assume that an advocate can identify client perjury. This assumption is
surely warranted in situations where counsel knows that the client is
lying, i.e., where the client changes the story that the client himself has
given to counsel, or where counsel has personal knowledge of the crucial
facts.38 A few judges have gone even further-quite improperly in my
view-in imposing gatekeeping responsibility on an advocate concerning
false testimony by opposing parties or adverse witnesses.39
On the other hand, many judges show strong sympathy for an
advocate whose client wants to commit perjury in a criminal case.' The
basis of this solicitude is not often articulated. However, the inference is
that these judges believe that the game of trying to compel counsel to be
a gatekeeper in this context is not worth the candle of the additional light
of truth that could be achieved. The advocate's knowledge of whether the
36. See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.); Kraakman,
supra note 18, at 888-98 (discussing gatekeeper liability and enforcement insufficiency).
37. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986).
38. See Committee on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298,305-06 (Iowa 1976)
(holding that an attorney cannot knowingly permit his client to lie at a deposition hearing, especially
if he has personal knowledge of the falsity).
39. See Doe v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing the trial
judge's determination that the lawyer had such an obligation).
40. See United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436,443-47 (8th Cir. 1988) (giving a defense attorney
leeway in presenting a client's testimony which he suspected to be false).
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client is lying will usually be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Hence, a court ordinarily can determine that the advocate knew that the
client's testimony would be false only on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. The principal circumstantial evidence will be the incredible
character of the client's testimony. However, if the client's testimony is
inherently incredible, then there is minimal added value in making the
advocate a gatekeeper. Put simply, when a client's fabrication is so
obvious that counsel must be held to know that it is such, then the
fabrication probably will also be obvious to the trier of fact.
Judges do not show similar solicitude for presentation of false
evidence in civil cases. The reason behind the differentiation is not
difficult to discern. The very fact of criminal prosecution means that an
accused has been designated by official authority--the prosecutor-as a
semi-outlaw. The accused in the criminal case is therefore in special need
of counsel. A civil claim does not have a similar imprimatur of public
authority and therefore does not imply similar ostracism. Accordingly,
there is a good case that the balance between candor to the court and
loyalty to the client should be struck differently for a criminal defense
attorney than for other advocates.
However, Judge Frankel's analysis reminds us that the problem of
viewpoint has more subtle dimensions. Plainly stated, every trial
submission by an advocate is a compromise between candor to the court
and loyalty to the client. If the advocate's duty was really that of
complete candor, and if such a duty actually reposed in advocates on
both sides, then a trial would be akin to making line-calls in polite
tennis; intervention by the referee will be required only when one of the
participants was not in a good position to observe the transaction as it
unfolded.
A trial in the adversary system, however, lacks such a quality.
Rather, it is a set of productions, orchestrated by opposing counsel, of
alternative narratives about the transaction in dispute. Neither narrative
can properly be taken as unqualifiedly true. Indeed, the realization that
party accounts cannot be taken as unqualifiedly true is the premise of the
adversary system. Judge Frankel goes even further and suggests that,
because the parties have collateral motives for distorting the facts, even
as they understood them, often neither narrative is unqualifiedly true,
even in terms of the partisan interests of the parties.4' Chief among the
motives is to present oneself as a good and competent person. It is
41. See Frankel, supra note 35, at 1035.
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notorious, for example, that witnesses reconstruct background facts that
they did not observe but which they imagine that they should have
observed. Counsel calculates how far to support this inclination on the
part of their witnesses, realizing both the need to produce an adequate
narrative and the risk that it will become an unbelievable caricature.
According to Judge Frankel's analysis, a trial is a competition of versions
not only to be discounted by the factor of interest in the outcome, but
also by the recognition of psychological needs having no direct relevance
to the matter under consideration.
These circumstances yield narratives at trial that are more or less
equally unbelievable. A mentor of Judge Frankel's and mine, Professor
Jerome Michael of Columbia Law School, long ago made this point in
a somewhat different way. Professor Michael suggested that a case
submitted to the jury, being by definition one which can rationally be
decided either way, must by the same token be one that cannot be
decided by reason.' In my opinion, the same can be said for cases
where the critical issue is one of law, which, by definition, cannot be
resolved simply by reference to the text of standing law.
Modem system analysis provides explanation for this phenomenon.
Although most cases are susceptible to rational disposition, these cases
are often the ones that settle. Most advocates are not fools, and hence
can recognize cases where the risk of losing is too high. Most clients are
susceptible to persuasion by their counsel. This leaves for adjudication
only those that are rationally intractable. A process of Darwinian
selection of cases for trial thus produces the small subset seen by Marvin
Frankel when he was a judge.
For this subset of cases presented to a judge, the tribunal's function
is not unlike that of a reader of Durrell's Alexandria Quartet; that is, by
creative imagination, drawing upon undisputed elements of the presenta-
tions, and working from inadvertently deposited clues in the conflicting
narratives, the trier of fact invents its own narrative. That narrative is
treated as fact by the legal system.43 These artifacts of legal process are
the premises upon which normative argument, deliberation, and decision
can proceed.
Everyone who seriously ponders the system of administered justice
wishes that we could get beyond this veil and find the truth. Such a wish
42. See Jerome Michael, The Basic Rules of Pleading, 5 RECORD 175, 199-200 (1950).
43. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
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seems to have inspired my friend Frankel, as judge, to undertake his
illuminating exposition. Perhaps reality compelled my friend to return to
practice. The same wish apparently underlies the litany of disparagement
of the adversary system in contemporary legal writing.' But a similar
irreconcilable gap between truth and discrepant narratives exists in the
other basic model of adjudication: the investigatorial model of the civil
law system. 4
I have no unblinking admiration for the adversary system. For
example, that system is not used in discourse over conflicts within a
family or a law firm. Nevertheless, a system of administered justice is
not simply discourse; it is certainly not a market transaction. Instead,
administration of legal justice entails a basic element of governmental
coercion.' The specter of coercion confronts every litigant and,
consequently, every advocate. The specter of exercising coercion on the
basis of imperfect knowledge confronts every judge. That is an irreduc-
ible difference in viewpoint.
VI. THE LEGAL COUNSELOR
In apposition to the role of "advocate," conventional terminology for
lawyer roles uses the term "counselor."'47 However, I feel it more
appropriate to use the term "transactional lawyer."
In the first place, it is relatively unusual for a lawyer to be simply
a legal counselor, that is, to be engaged merely in giving advice to a
client. Advice as such is simply a statement about how the client might
proceed. But advice generally takes the form of guidance that is implicit
in the lawyer's taking steps to further a transaction. Even advice in the
form of an opinion letter usually is given only in anticipation of a
subsequent need to present documentary proof that the client undertook
a challenged course of action on the basis of such advice. In that context,
the opinion letter is a legally operative document much like an
accountant's audit report. It is created against the possibility that the
opinion can usefully be shown to some third party. Hence, an opinion
44. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.
45. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN
INTRODUCTION (1993).
46. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1616 (1986).
47. Thus, the terms "counselor" and "advocate" are used respectively for the applicable
provisions in the Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 2.1-.3, 3.1-.9
(1992).
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letter constitutes not merely advice, but an act of assistance to the client.
Even more distinctly, legal advice is most commonly provided in
connection with, or in the form of, other assistance to the client.
Incorporating a venture rather than organizing it as a partnership, for
example, embodies legal advice even if the basis of the choice is not
expressly conveyed to the client. Inclusion or exclusion from a disclosure
statement of a debatably material fact is similarly an act of assistance
embodying advice. So too is documentation of a testamentary disposition
or preparation of a proposal in negotiation. Like an opinion letter, a
legally significant document is an operative ingredient of a transaction.
The propriety of simply giving legal advice is constrained only by
minimal limitations. The rules of professional ethics prohibit a lawyer
from "counseling" conduct that is criminal or fraudulent.'O The comment
to the relevant Model Rule states: "There is a critical distinction between
presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and
recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed
with impunity.'
149
The law of civil liability for complicity in a client's conduct may go
further than crimes or fraud. Some authorities contend that the prohibi-
tion extends to counseling other "illegal conduct."5 However, it seems
clear that counseling a client about breaching a contract does not result
in liability for interference with contract, although a lay person might be
liable in such circumstances.51 In any event, the operative verb remains
"counseling."
In order to interpret the verb "counseling" one must resort to general
legal parlance concerning complicity in another's illegal act. In that
terminology the term signifies a specific purpose to further another's
purpose, that of a client. 2 I will leave to others the problem of distin-
guishing analytically or empirically between such a purpose, on the one
hand, and the "mere awareness" that the client is likely to take account
of the lawyer's advice, on the other hand. My own view is that the
48. See id. Rule 1.2(d).
49. Id. Rule 1.2 cmt.; see also Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An
Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE U. 1545 (1995) (discussing the
lawyer's role in providing lawful assistance to a client who uses such assistance to carry out illegal
activity).
50. See CHARLES W. VOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 703-05 (1986).
51. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally
Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669 (1981) (discussing the lawyer's role in providing
lawful assistance to a client who uses such assistance to carry out an illegal act).
52. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (1985).
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distinction is like many other distinctions that are clear in concept but
ineffable as a matter of proof. We adhere to the distinction in conceptual
discourse, but in administration we consign it to a jury as an issue of
fact.
Ordinarily, however, counseling about a transaction that entails legal
risk proceeds to assistance in such a transaction. The relevance of this
next step is apparent: providing assistance to a client's criminal or
fraudulent enterprise constitutes aiding and abetting under criminal law
and constitutes tortious conspiracy under the law of civil liability.53 The
law determining criminal or civil complicity applies to the conduct of a
lawyer who assists in a transaction. 4
Another way of stating this proposition is that the normal course of
a legal counselor's professional work, as distinct from the normal course
of an advocate's professional work, is governed by a body of law that
imposes liability for complicity in engagements that turn out to entail
crime or fraud. Under modem law, many transactions that go beyond
safe territory are defined as crime or fraud. Moreover, perhaps more so
today than in the past, a high premium for clients attaches to transactions
that go as close as possible to the bounds of the law.5 Accordingly, the
transactional lawyer ubiquitously faces risk of legal complicity in
transactions that go as close to the line of legality as is invited by the
prospect of client profits.
The viewpoint of a transactional lawyer concerning a legally
questionable transaction is very different from that of an advocate or a
judge. For an advocate, a legally questionable transaction is simply
another case even when it involves the conduct of a lawyer. To be sure,
an advocate prosecuting a case against a fellow attorney may have mixed
emotions running from disgust to regret. An advocate for such a
defendant may well come to believe that the client was a poor sap, hood-
winked by a malfeasant client. In either event, the advocates will
consider such a case as a problem of presentation in court. The essential
53. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997) (imposing criminal liability
on an accomplice for intentionally aiding another to engage in criminal conduct, while at the same
time acting with the required mental culpability of the underlying offense).
54. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
ProfessionalNorm, 33 EMoRY L.J. 271,276-77 (1984); Thomas D. Morgan, Sanctions and Remedies
for Attorney Misconduct, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 343, 345-47 (1995).
55. This proposition is implicit in the formula in the Code of Professional Responsibility that
requires a lawyer to "represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1986). Transactional lawyers have always felt very
uncomfortable with this formulation.
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problem for the lawyer's advocate is estimating the chance of persuading
a trier of fact that someone else was the mastermind of the transaction,
and the lawyer was merely an innocent instrument of a perfidious client.
These days, the chances of success in such an endeavor are less than
when members of our profession were considered prima facie honorable
persons. Nevertheless, the task for the advocates and their orientation to
the case are not much different from other cases involving allegations of
white-collar wrongdoing. When the chance of success looks poor, the
case should be settled, if possible.
From the judicial viewpoint, a case involving the conduct of a
lawyer is also much like any other case involving fraud or breach of
trust. Therefore, such a case is likely to be complicated and involves a
great deal of documentary evidence, making matters even more difficult
for a jury. The case typically will involve explanations by the accused
that are extensive and verbally facile, whether credible or not. The pre-
trial process, particularly discovery in civil cases, will be protracted.
However, these characteristics are familiar in modem litigation.
Until recently, many judges seem to have had difficulty with the
idea that reputable lawyers are capable of helping a client by illegal
means. 6 That naivet6 is currently receding. Hence, a transactional
lawyer facing a plausible claim of complicity in client fraud is in a
legally dangerous situation. Juries are mistrustful, and lawyers can no
longer count on professional sympathy from the bench.
The transactional lawyer, unlike the advocate or the judge, functions
inside the law's system of governance rather than outside of it. Every
conflict check entails risk of a subsequent claim of improper conflict of
interest, while entailing present risk of losing a potential client. Every
disclosure determination entails risk of a subsequent claim that material
information was withheld, while also entailing present risk of offending
a client. Every joint representation--such as estate planning for husband
and wife--entails risk of a subsequent claim of favoritism and nondisclo-
sure.57 The same holds true for organizing business ventures for multiple
56. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
plaintiff's claim that the seller's attorneys "substantially assisted" the seller in a securities violation
must fail, where the attorneys "merely ... put into writing the terms" to which the parties agreed);
Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 123-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that the appellant
attorney's retention of physical evidence while representing a defendant in a murder trial was not
proper under existing law, but ultimately finding the statutes under which they were convicted to be
unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to criminal defense attorneys).
57. For a discussion of ethical concerns relating to joint representation in estate planning, see
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Family as a Client-Conflict or Community?, 34 R.s GESTAE 62 (1990);
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clients where there is the risk that the clients will be exasperated if it is
insisted that they be separately represented."
If the transaction is called into legal question, the transactional
lawyer will not be organizing a forensic production for a judicial
appraisal, as is the function of the advocate. Instead, the transactional
lawyer's conduct will be the very subject of judicial appraisal. The
appraisal will be conducted through the mechanism of counterpoised
productions by advocates acting for and against the transactional lawyer.
Most transactional lawyers have absorbed the gallows humor about
litigation that is the small talk of their colleagues in the trial bar. Indeed,
it is often revulsion to the gambling-table aura of litigation that leads
transactional lawyers to pursue their specialties in the law. The trial
mechanism, as understood by the typical transactional lawyer, epitomizes
arbitrariness, an understanding for which Judge Frankel's analysis
provides support. 9
The anxieties generated by these conditions translate into the
heightened concern by law firms about civil liability. Malpractice liability
coverage is no longer a professional bagatelle. "Loss prevention"
programs are standard practice. Internal peer review is a precaution
increasingly employed. Preparing memoranda for the file is strongly
encouraged, so too are letters to clients on matters that formerly were
covered orally or by tacit assumption. Corporate forms of firm organiza-
tion, with limitation on individual responsibility for liability of other
lawyers, have become legitimate.
Trial lawyers often speak of the forensic arena as "the pit," referring
to the pit where cockfights are held.' A transactional lawyer looks at
Mercer D. Tate, Handling Conflicts of Interest That May Occur in an Estate Planning Practice, 16
ESTATE PLANNING 32 (1989).
58. See, e.g.,John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Mulliple
Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 741, 743 ('Lawyers commonly
represent multiple clients with potentially conflicting interests without carefully considering the
ethical implications because clients often demand common representation of their interests.").
59. See Frankel, supra note 35, at 1031 (arguing that our adversary system rates truth too low
among the values that our justice system is meant to serve).
60. See, e.g., William Domnarski, The Autobiographical Lawyer, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 165, 169-
70 (1994-1995).
"[I]t is my courtroom, my judge, my jury... and when the jury says no ... they are
saying no to all of me since I have put all of me in the pit.... When I walk out of a
courtroom with the jury's verdict I never feel joy at such triumphs, just relief, and I know
that my reward for having won that gunfight is to be thrown into another pit alive to fight
again."
Id. (quoting GERRY SPENCE & ANTHONY POLK, GUNNING FOR JUSTICE 15, 17 (1982)).
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the pit from the viewpoint of one of the chickens.
VII. THE LEGISLATOR
All these versions of experience are true in some sense. Certainly
they are true in the vivid subjective sense in which life is actually
encountered, as in the Alexandria Quartet. Accordingly, the legislative
function--the task of formulating the law that governs lawyers--must
take all these versions into account. Among my most enlightening
professional experiences are those that involve this task-as draftsperson
for the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and
now monitor of the American Law Institute project for the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers.
As my colleague Professor Susan Koniak has written, practicing
lawyers have persistently sought to interject their version of reality into
the rules of lawyer ethics." It is well documented that advocates in the
bar had decisive influence in limiting the authority of a lawyer to
disclose client wrongdoing.' Ironically, that influence was effective
notwithstanding the limitations detrimentally imposed on transactional
lawyers. One might say that judges have had similar influence on the
rules that govern them, i.e., judicial opposition to peremptory challenge
of judges.
There can be no complete transcendence of viewpoint in formulating
the law that governs lawyers. There is no legal Mount Olympus on which
legislative scribes can ensconce themselves. However, an attempt must
be made to view the problem of the lawyer's response to client fraud and
other wrongdoing in terms of the various perspectives I have sketched.
Accordingly, we might consider the following possibilities:
1. Distinguishing more sharply than under the present law the
function of advocate and the function of transactional lawyer. The present
law appropriately makes a sharp distinction between the function of
judge and the function of advocate. Indeed, they govern these two roles
with different codes.
61. See Koniak, supra note 5, at 1391 ("There is a continuing struggle between the [legal]
profession and the state over whether the profession's vision of law or the state's will
reign .... [T]he legal profession does maintain a strong competing normative vision and that it
struggles with the state to assert the primacy of that vision.").
62. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 677,702-03 (1989) (reporting that members of the bar
actively protested the August 1979 draft of the Model Rules in order to protect client confidentiali-
ty).
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2. Distinguishing the function of criminal defense counsel from
other advocate roles. I have come to the view that requiring a criminal
defense lawyer to "blow the whistle" on client perjury is futile or
counterproductive. The law already recognizes a distinction between the
duties of a prosecuting attorney and those of defense counsel in criminal
cases. The distinction I am suggesting would simply carry the differenti-
ation a step further.
3. Imposing more definite duties of candor on advocates in civil
cases. Such a step could follow from differentiating the duties of
prosecution and criminal defense counsel from those of advocates in civil
cases. An interesting step in this direction has been taken in the recent
New York rules governing disclosure of financial information in divorce
litigation.63 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now have an experi-
mental provision requiring affirmative discovery in civil cases.' I have
serious doubts about the specific formulation of this requirement, but not
about the underlying concept. That is, it can be imagined that counsel in
a civil case should be required to disclose at the discovery stage the
substance of all testimony and documentary and other real evidence to
be offered at trial on penalty of exclusion of evidence that was not so
disclosed. It can be further imagined that counsel in civil cases could be
required to make a personal certification covering the search made in
response to demands for documents and other real evidence. Transaction-
al counsel in securities cases presently have a comparable duty under the
rubric of "due diligence."65
4. Differentiating the functions of transactional lawyers. For
example:
. The duty to refrain from assisting a client in criminal or
fraudulent transactions could be made more exacting. A contemporaneous
memorandum of fact and law about the legality of a transaction could be
required in every seriously questionable transaction in which a lawyer
provides assistance.
• The duty to avoid conflict of interest could be reinforced by
a requirement-as now exists under California law--of written consent
63. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(4) (MeKinney Supp. 1997) (providing that "[i]n all
matrimonial actions and proceedings in which alimony, maintenance or support is in issue, there
shall be compulsory disclosure by both parties of their respective financial states").
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
65. See, e.g., Jennifer O'Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of
Liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 217, 229-30 (outlining
the various steps involved in the "due diligence" process).
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by the clients to a conflict of interest.6
- The duties of corporate counsel set forth in Model Rule 1.13
could be tightened, for example, by requiring a stricter referral of legally
questionable substantial transactions to the board of directors or a special
committee of the board.
- It could be made clearer that client fraud against the govern-
ment, including material nondisclosure in tax reporting, is not any less
of a fraudulent act simply because the victim is the government.
- It could be required that a lawyer assisting in preparation of
a document submitted to an opposing party or to a government agency
affirm that he knows no facts inconsistent with those stated in the
submission.
Proposals such as these may be burdensome, but, in light of their
potential benefits, they are not unreasonable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing suggestions for modification of the law governing
lawyers are illustrations, not recommendations. They illustrate the
proposition that it is quite possible to make sharper distinctions between
the functions of advocate and transactional lawyer, as we have made
between the functions of lawyer and judge, and to demand more of
lawyers in their function as gatekeeper to the marketplace and in
interfaces with the government. It is, of course, unfashionable these days
to consider the possibility of more exacting regulation. Nevertheless,
more exacting requirements on the legal profession could facilitate less
exacting ones on the clients.
There is no vantage point from which we can make perfect rules.
However, there are amendments that can be more seriously considered
if we take into account the various perspectives of lawyers in different
positions in the legal system.
66. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-3 10(A) (1994) (providing that
in a conflict of interest situation, a lawyer "shall not accept or continue... representation without
all affected clients' informed written consent").
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